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Abstract
How has the process of international economic integration advanced over the last four
decades? How will the foreseeable future look like? We attempt to answer this sort of
questions by considering some methods which have scarcely been used in the literature on
globalization. First, we consider a set of indicators which measure not only the degree of
openness of economies, but also how connected they are to each other, following Arribas et al.
(2007). Second, we assess how these indicators have evolved over time, what the likely steady
state distribution might be, and whether results differ depending on a variety of weighting
schemes (GDP, population). Results show that, under current trends, the future world will be
much more integrated, especially for the most heavily populated countries. However, there is
still a long way to go before the Standard of Perfect International Integration can be achieved.
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1. Introduction
Interest in the international integration of economies and the wide perception that we are entering
an advanced phase of globalization have stirred up important debates among academics and
institutions, of which we find three worth mentioning. The first discusses the at which the
integration process is advancing, its regularity from a historic point of view and its consequences
for growth and income convergence among countries (Baldwin and Martin, 1999; Crafts, 2000;
Milanovic, 2006; O’Rourke andWilliamson, 2002; Rodríguez and Rodrik, 2001; Williamson, 1996).
The second focuses on the singular characteristics of the most recent wave of globalization, the
implications of its present technological basis and its effects on winners and losers in the new
competitive setting (Bhagwati, 2004b,a; Rodrik, 1998a,b; Stiglitz, 2002, 2006; Wolf, 2005). The
third debate is prospective and is more evident among institutions; it discusses the key factors
(demographic, financial, commercial, technological and political) that determine in which settings
the world economy will be situated if the trends of recent decades persist for another generation,
and the obstacles that might threaten the continuity of this process (World Bank, 2007; OECD,
2007; Goldman Sachs, 2004).
The renewed interest in the advance of integration1 and the singularities of the most recent
wave of globalization are not, as yet, reflected in substantial improvements to the quantitative
indicators referring to these processes. On the one hand, when evaluating the advance of glob-
alization, integration indicators in the strict sense and the variables that represent the causes,
consequences and obstacles to it, are not sufficiently distinguished (Frankel, 2000; Frankel and
Rose, 2000; Rauch and Casella, 2003; Rodrik, 1998c, 2000; Salvatore, 2004; Stiglitz, 2002). On
the other hand, the most commonly used quantitative reference to measure integration contin-
ues to be the external, commercial or financial degree of openness, an unsatisfactory variable
in two important aspects: generally, it does not correct the bias derived from country size, and
neither does it reveal one of the most important characteristics of integration today, namely, the
development of much denser networks among countries or, as termed by Kali et al. (2007), the
structure of trade, which refers to the number of trade partners and the concentration of trade
among trading partners.
A recent study (Arribas et al., 2007) proposes axiomatic and globalization measures of inter-
national economic integration (hereafter IEI) based on distinguishing and combining the degrees
1Although we will use the terms “globalization” and “international economic integration” as synonymous we
recognize that they are not exactly the same since, as indicated by Rodrik (2000), the latter has a distinct meaning
which is self-evident for economists, whereas the former is used in different ways by different analysts. Therefore,
when referring to globalization we will be referring solely to its economic aspects.
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of openness and of connection—both direct and indirect—of the underlying economies in the
foreign trade networks. This approach allows us to define a precise Standard of Perfect Inter-
national Integration (SPII) (Frankel, 2000) which characterizes the situation in which economies
trade among themselves as though no barriers and transaction costs existed. In a world in which
technology and the removal of obstacles to commerce make costs of trading with external agents
irrelevant, the weight of a country in the demand of another is essentially determined by its size.
The SPII provides for a situation in which exchanges take place as if the world operated as true
global village, and allows us to to measure the level of integration or globalization reached with
regard to it. It also enables us to estimate the extent to which the two determining factors of
integration contribute to its evolution, these factors being openness of economies and the changes
in their commercial networks with other countries.
Following this methodology, Arribas et al. (2007) estimate the degree of openness, of connec-
tion and of integration for 59 economies that represent 96.7% of world output, during the period
1967–2004. On the basis of these estimations it will be possible to conduct future analyses of the
determinants of the different levels of integration reached and their consequences. According to
already available results, the advance of international integration in recent decades has been sub-
stantial, evaluated between 75% and 100%, depending on the importance given to the increase
of indirect relationships among economies, facilitated by ICT and improvements in transport.
However, the distance between the current situation and the SPII is still notable, as we are not
yet halfway, due, above all, to the greater domestic bias of the largest economies, for which the
degree of openness is limited. Nevertheless, one of the results observed in the cited study is the
diversity of situations among countries, both in the degree of integration reached in their paths of
advance. In both aspects the differences among countries are noticeable in terms of their degree
of openness, but also in the characteristics of their networks (i.e., their trade structures). Thus,
there are not only more open or closed countries, but also economies with more stable structures
of foreign trade or with a greater bias towards certain trading partners, generally towards the
region of the world to which they belong.
The aim of this study, based on the IEI measures of Arribas et al. (2007), is to conduct an
in-depth analysis of the dynamics of globalization in three directions:
1. To characterize the evolution of the set of integration indicators and project their tendencies,
in order to identify the stylized facts of the scenario we are heading towards.
2. To study the speed of the globalization process in the period analyzed and the time required
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to achieve a substantial increase in the level of IEI towards which we are moving, under
current trends.
3. To evaluate the acceleration in integration that appears to have been happening since the
nineties, as a result of technological changes and of the economic orientation of numerous
economies during this period.
These objectives are pursued using a variety of techniques. First, we consider the methods by
Arribas et al. (2007) to measure integration, which combine the traditional degree of openness
with a new measure, inspired by network analysis, designed to compute the degree of connection
among economies. This focus is not entirely new in international economics, and has received
considerable attention in recent studies (Combes et al., 2005; Greaney, 2003; Pandey and Whalley,
2004; Kali and Reyes, 2007; Rauch, 1999, 2001; Rauch and Trindade, 2002; Rauch and Casella,
2003).
In a second stage, in order to assess how integration indicators evolve over time, and to
characterize their dynamics, we consider a variety of techniques which have been widely employed
in the field of empirical growth and convergence (see Durlauf and Quah, 1999), and in the field
of inequality measurement (Shorrocks, 1978).
These techniques enable us to examine a variety of issues related to globalization dynamics.
For instance, they provide answers to the question of how the external shape of the degree of
openness distribution (for instance) evolves over time, and what type of distribution will emerge in
the long run. Clearly, one may infer that multiple scenarios might arise; a few of these possibilities
may be a future world in which most economies are very open, or very closed, or a polarized world
in which many economies are very open, but many others are quite closed.
Additionally, we can also weigh in the question of whether substantial intra-distribution mo-
bility exists, i.e., in the case of the degree of openness, whether open economies typically stay
open, and whether closed economies typically stay closed. Assuming that an economy lies in the
lower tail of the distribution of, say, degrees of openness, what would be the probability over a
given period of time (1 year, 5 years, 10 years, etc.) that this economy will remain in the same
place? What is the probability that it will move to the upper tail of the distribution? That
question may likewise be posed with regard to the other sets of indicators, so as to achieve an
enhanced view of how globalization evolves throughout time.
This model, although very intensely used by the empirical growth and convergence literature,
has not been considered so far to measure the prospects of globalization, despite its potential for
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providing answers to some relevant questions such as those raised by Rodrik (2000) as to “how
much more integration could there be?”, or whether international economic integration remains
limited, or perhaps some rationale that prevents us from more than “speculating wildly” on the
perspectives of international economic integration. The specifics of the dynamics of globalization
have received little systematic attention, and the methodologies applied here try to fill the gap.
After this introduction, the remainder of the study is structured as follows. Section 2 summa-
rizes the methodology used to determine the integration indicators employed, and their definitions
and properties, following Arribas et al. (2007). Section 3 presents the criteria and the formal tools
used to study the distribution dynamics of the globalization indicators, based on Quah (1993,
1996b,d) and Redding (2002). Section 4 describes the database used and section 5, the results.
Section 6 concludes.
2. Methodology
2.1. Integration indicators: definitions and properties
Arribas et al. (2007) introduce measures for international economic integration and globalization
starting from a set of basic axioms and the definition of a set of indicators conceived to achieve two
objectives: to uncover the role of the network and to define a Standard of Perfect International
Integration. These axioms are as follows:
1. Uncovering the role of the network implies accepting that the advance of international
economic integration operates through both higher openness and higher connectedness to
other economies, following both direct and indirect paths.
2. Any attempt to characterize a scenario in which economies are entirely integrated/globalized
(Standard of Perfect International Integration) is to describe the conditions under which
the world economy would operate as a global village.
Therefore, this approach would enable us to assess the distance that separates the current
level of international economic integration from the scenario of complete globalization.
The components of the economic network follow. Let N be the set of nodes or economies and
g the number of elements in N . We denote by Xij the flow from economy i to economy j and by
Yj the size (GDP) of economy j. The flow from economy i to economy j, Xij , can be measured
both through the imports and through the exports of goods and services, and in general it can
be evaluated through any other flow measured in the same units as Yi.
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In order to control for home bias, we define Ŷi as the exports’ share of GDP taking into
account the weight in the world economy of the economy considered Ŷi = Yi − aiYi, where ai is
the economy i’s relative weight w.r.t. to the world economy, ai = Yi/
∑
j∈N Yj. We also assume
that Xii = 0 for all economies i ∈ N .
To determine the degree of integration, we proceed in three stages, where different indicators
will be defined.
Stage 1: Degree of openness
In the first stage we characterize the degree of openness. We start with the usual definition
found in the literature but corrected for home bias so as to take into account the different sizes
of the economies under analysis.
If Xij is the trade from economy i to economy j, then
DO(X)ij =
Xij
Ŷi
(1)
is the relative flow or degree of openness between economies i and j which, for the sake of
simplicity, will be denoted as DOij. Given that Xii = 0, it follows that DOii = 0.
Definition 1 Given an economy i ∈ N we define its degree of openness, DOi, as
DOi =
∑
j∈N
DOij =
∑
j∈N Xij
Ŷi
. (2)
The degree of openness yields results (in general) within the (0, 1) interval, where a value of
0 indicates that the economy is closed (compared to the measure of flow chosen) and a value of
1 indicates a lack of home bias in the economy (total openness).
Stage 2: Degree of total connection
In the economic network, the relative flow from economy i to economy j, in terms of the total
flow of economy i is given by
αij =
Xij∑
j∈N Xij
(3)
where A = (αij) is the matrix of relative flows.
Furthermore, a world economy is perfectly connected if the above value is equal to the relative
weight of economy j in a world where economy i is excluded,
βij =
Yj∑
k∈N\i Yk
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Note that βij is the degree of openness between economies i and j in a perfectly connected
world, where βii = 0; B = (βij) is the degree of openness matrix.
Let γ ∈ (0, 1) be the share of trade (on average) between two countries which remains in the
importing country for internal consumption, whereas 1 − γ is the share of trade between these
two countries which is re-exported from the importing country to a third country, possibly after
some re-elaboration. Alternatively, we can interpret the inverse of γ as the number of trades (on
average) for each commodity, from the first exporting country up to the last importing country.
The total volume of exports from a given economy i to another economy j is the sum of the
direct and indirect flows between the two economies, and can be estimated as2
A∞ = (α∞ij ) =
∞∑
n=1
γ(1− γ)n−1An, (4)
B∞ = (β∞ij ) =
∞∑
n=1
γ(1− γ)n−1Bn. (5)
Definition 2 Given an economy i ∈ N we define the degree of total connection of i as
DTCi =
∑
j∈N α
∞
ij β
∞
ij√∑
j∈N
(
α∞ij
)2√∑
j∈N
(
β∞ij
)2 .
The degree of total connection is within the (0, 1) interval, and it measures the distance
between an economy’s current flows (either exports or imports) and those it would have in a
perfectly connected world. It should approach 1 if the flows of the economy are proportional
to the size of the receiving economies, and be close to zero if the largest economies receive no
commodities and the smallest receive all of them.
However, DTC hinges on the γ parameter, which measures how indirect flows affect connec-
tions among economies. Thus, the degree of total connection for any economy i is a decreasing
function of γ so that the larger the weight of the indirect flows, the larger the DTC will be.
Stage 3: Degree of integration
2It can be proved that one way to compute A∞ and B∞ is by using the expressions
A
∞ =
γ
1− γ
 
[I − (1− γ)A]−1 − I

,
B
∞ =
γ
1− γ
 
[I − (1− γ)B]−1 − I

.
where I is the identity matrix of order g (see Arribas et al., 2007).
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Definition 3 Given an economy i ∈ N we define the degree of integration of i as
DIi =
√
DOi·DTCi
The degree of integration of an economy is the geometric average of both its degrees of
openness and total connection; thus DI hinges on both the openness of the economy and the
balance in its direct and indirect flows. Therefore, we are taking into account not only how open
an economy is, but also its trade structure, namely, how many partners it has, the concentration
of trade among partners, how large its partners are, and whether they might re-export to other
countries. This means that our measures take into account both traditional measures of openness
(export and import volume or shares) and also other measures that could be reflecting trade
strategies, including those emerging after the establishment of different trade agreements (see
Kali et al., 2007).
3. Dynamics
We use a set of instruments to measure globalization dynamics essentially drawn from the liter-
ature on empirical growth and convergence and the literature on economic inequality (see Quah,
1993, 1996b,d; Shorrocks, 1978; Kremer et al., 2001).
In our particular setting, we can refer to si,t as country i’s indicator (either DO, DTC or
DI) in period t, whereas Ft(s) refers to the cumulative distribution of si,t across countries, and
corresponding to Ft(s) we can define a probability measure λt s.t.:
λt((−∞, s]) = Ft(s), ∀s ∈ R. (6)
In this context, λt is the probability density function for each indicator across countries in
period t, and the model analyzes the dynamics of λt, i.e., the dynamics of the cross-section
distribution of either DO, DTC or DI, for which we consider a stochastic difference equation:
λt = P
∗(λt−1, ut), integer t, (7)
where {ut : integer t} is the sequence of disturbances of the entire distribution, and P ∗ is the
operator mapping disturbances and probability measures into probability measures. In other
words, the P ∗ operator would reveal information on how the distribution of, for instance, the
degrees of openness (DO) at time t− 1 (DOt−1) transforms into a different distribution at time
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t (DOt).
Following Redding (2002), we may assume that the stochastic difference equation is first order
and that operator P ∗ is time invariant. Thus, setting null values to disturbances and iterating in
(7) we obtain the future evolution of the distribution:
λt+τ = (P
∗ · P ∗ · . . . · P ∗)λt = (P ∗)τλt (8)
If we divide, or discretize, the set of possible values of s into a finite number of cells k ∈
{1, . . . ,K}, then P ∗ becomes a transition probability matrix
λt+1 = P
∗ · λt (9)
where λt is now a K × 1 vector of probabilities that a given country indicator (DO, DTC, or
DI) is located in a given grid at time t.
In the case studied here, discretization is meant to divide the space of possible Ft values into
several discrete grid cells, or states, ek, k = 1, . . . ,K. Then, after classifying each country-year
observation into one of the K states, we build up a 20× 20 matrix whose pkl entries indicate the
probability that a country initially in state k will transit to state l during the period or periods
considered (T ). Thus each row of the matrix constitutes a vector of transition probabilities,
which add up to unity. We choose the boundaries between grid cells such that country-year
observations are divided approximately equally between the cells, and each cell corresponds to
approximately one twentieth of the distribution of either DO, DTC, or DI across countries
and time. Therefore, in the case of DO, observations in the first state refer to the more closed
countries. This criterion has been followed, amongst many others, by Redding (2002), or Lamo
(2000), and constitutes a reasonable choice in the absence of other theoretical justifications.
Others have followed different criteria such as choosing the grid arbitrarily yet (according to their
advocates) reasonably (Kremer et al., 2001; Quah, 1993). An alternative strategy to avoid the
discretization problem is to consider stochastic kernels (Quah, 1996c), which may be thought
of conditional density estimation (Bashtannyk and Hyndman, 2001); however, there are some
difficulties in estimating the ergodic, or stationary distribution. We deal with this issue further
on in the paper.
Therefore, through these transition probability matrices we can measure the probability that
a country with a certain degree of openness, degree of total connection, or degree of integration,
may move to a higher (or lower) position. To calculate the transition probability matrices we
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start by discretizing or dividing the set of observations of the variable into a certain number
of states ek. For example, state ek = (0.2, 0.4) would include those countries with degrees of
openness between 0.2 and 0.4. The value of each entry in the matrix indicates the probability
that a given country will transit out during the period or periods considered from its initial state
to other states.
Transitions are estimated by counting the number of transitions out of and into each cell, i.e.,
for each pkl cell:
pkl =
1
T − 1
T−1∑
t=1
ntkl
ntk
(10)
where T is the number of years or periods, ntkl is the number of countries moving during one
period from class k to class l, and ntk is the total number of countries that started the period in
class l.
Some authors have claimed that the arbitrary discretization of the state space into a given
number of states may affect the results. For instance, Quah (1997) and Bulli (2001) indicate that
the process of discretizing the state space of a continuous variable is necessarily arbitrary and
can alter the probabilistic properties of the data. Some other authors (Reichlin, 1999) also argue
that the apparent long-run implications of the dynamic behavior of the distribution in question
are also sensitive to discretization.
However, most of these claims are based on results for 5× 5 matrices. We partly circumvent
them by considering a much larger number of states (20) than the standard practice. Other
methods proposed by the literature to avoid these criticisms (see Johnson, 2005) consider kernel
smoothing methods. However, these methods also ultimately discretize, since the functions in
which they are based have to be evaluated over a given set of points. If the set of points is large
enough, we may end up with the visual impression that there is no discretization. Obviously,
choosing an arbitrarily large number of states for the discrete Markov chain methods would yield
analogous results.
3.1. Weighted transition probability matrices
Transitions are estimated by counting the number of countries moving from one state to another.
However, due to the large disparities between countries observed both across their populations and
their economic sizes (GDP), it may be equally relevant to estimate weighted transition probability
matrices. The underlying idea is that the impact on world globalization will be greater if a larger
country transits out than if a small country does so. Therefore, we count countries’ transitions,
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but in this case each country is represented by its entire share of world population (in the case
of population-weighted transition probability matrices), or its share of world GDP (in the case
of GDP-weighted matrices). This issue is often ignored, although exceptions do exist such as
Kremer et al. (2001) or Quah (2003).
3.2. Ergodic distributions
Operating with the information offered by the transition probability matrix, we can characterize
the hypothetical long term, by means of ergodic, or stationary distribution. Several results or
scenarios may arise: from a distribution with the probability mass concentrated mainly in the
central class or classes (indicative of convergence “towards the mean”, if these central states contain
that moment of the distribution) to a more polarized distribution, or one with the probability mass
distributed in the extreme classes (tails) of the distribution. Therefore, ergodic, or stationary,
distribution helps us to uncover the degree to which the set of countries in our sample presents
a tendency to convergence, to polarization, or to other likely scenarios, for any of the indicators
considered (DO, DTC, orDI). Therefore, it provides information on the evolution of the external
shapes of the distribution of the variables at hand.
3.3. Transition path analysis and mobility indices
Following Kremer et al. (2001) we can also assess the speed of convergence to the steady state,
or ergodic distribution, by means of the asymptotic half-life of convergence, H−L, which reveals
how long it takes (years) for the norm of the difference between the current (2004) distribution
and the ergodic distribution to decrease by half. Its formula is as follows:
H − L = − log 2
log |λ2| (11)
where |λ2| is the second largest eigenvalue (after 1) of the transition probability matrix.
Finally, we also consider a mobility index from the literature on economic inequality (Shorrocks,
1978; Geweke et al., 1986), which can be applied straightforwardly to our setting. As suggested
by Quah (1996a), akin to measures of income inequality designed to collapse the information
contained in an entire distribution into a single scalar, a mobility index summarizes the mobility
information in a transition probability matrix into one number. We consider the proposals by
Shorrocks (1978) and Geweke et al. (1986), summarized by Quah (1996a) and also employed by
Redding (2002). This index satisfies certain properties; in particular, by defining the mobility
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index as a continuous real function µ(·) over the set of transition matrices P, the index satisfies
the properties of normalization, monotonicity, immobility, and perfect mobility (see Shorrocks,
1978). The index (µ1) evaluates the trace of the transition probability matrix and, according to
Shorrocks (1978), it discloses information on the relative magnitude of diagonal and off-diagonal
terms, and it is identical to the inverse of the harmonic mean of expected durations of remaining
in a certain state (Redding, 2002).
Following Quah (1996a), its particular expression is:
µ1(P
∗) =
K − tr(P ∗)
K − 1 =
( K
K − 1
){
K−1
∑
j
(1− P ∗jj)
}
=
K −∑j λj
K − 1 (12)
where K is the number of states, P ∗jj denotes the j-diagonal entry of matrix P
∗ representing the
probability of remaining in state j, and λj are the eigenvalues of P
∗.3 The µ1 index suggests
mobility, since larger values indicate less persistence, or more mobility, in P ∗.
3.4. Statistical significance
We also examine the statistical significance of the differences between the transition probability
matrices to be estimated. In particular, we examine the differences between unweighted and
weighted transition probability matrices, and also between indices obtained for γ = 1 and for
γ = 0.5. In each case, the null hypothesis is that the compared matrices are equal.
The statistic we use to evaluate the null hypothesis is distributed as:
M1 =
K∑
i=1
K∑
j=1
piipij log2
pij
tij
∼ χ2K(K−1) (13)
where pij and tij correspond to the ij cells of the matrices being compared, pii is the ergodic
distribution of the matrix being evaluated, and log2 is the base 2 logarithm.
3.5. The external shape of the distributions
Although basic results include computation of transition probability matrices and ergodic distrib-
utions, we also consider it relevant to provide information on both the initial and final distributions
for each of the indicators in Section 2, in order to gain further insights on how distributions have
3Quah (1996a) suggests some additional indices which might not always yield non-coincidental results, and are
not directly related to each other; however, under some specific circumstances they can be identical (see Quah,
1996a).
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evolved. Therefore, for all indicators we provide four sets of additional results, namely, transition
probability matrices, ergodic distributions, initial distributions, and final distributions.
However, in their present form, all three sets of distributions share a common disadvantage,
namely, they are discrete and probability is spread out across one set of states only. Although
we have provided reasons why such a disadvantage may not be as restrictive as some authors
suggest, we try to be as informative as possible by also providing the continuous counterpart
to this discrete estimation, namely, the nonparametric estimation of density functions via kernel
smoothing.
To do this, we consider a kernel estimator for each indicator:
fˆ(x) =
1
Nh
N∑
i=1
K
(‖x−Xi‖x
h
)
(14)
where x is the point of evaluation, X is the indicator of interest, N is the number of observations
(countries), h is the bandwidth, ‖ ·‖x is a distance metric on the space of X, and K(x) is a kernel
function (see Härdle and Linton, 1994) which are generally required to hold that:
∫
R
K(x)dx = 1,
∫
R
xK(x)dx = 0, σ2K =
∫
R
x2K(x)dx <∞ (15)
There are several choices for K(x), which may be defined in terms of univariate and unimodal
probability density functions. For simplicity, we consider a Gaussian kernel:
K(x) = (1/
√
2pi)e−
1
2
x2 (16)
Weighting densities (in order to provide continuous counterparts to the weighted initial and
final distributions) requires slight modifications. Few studies have considered this, despite its
potential relevance in some specific contexts. Following Goerlich (2003), expression (14) is slightly
modified to become:
fˆω(x) =
1
h
N∑
i=1
ωiK
(‖x−Xi‖x
h
)
(17)
where ωi is the share of either world output or world population (depending on the type of
weighting we consider) corresponding to country i.
Estimating the continuous version of the ergodic distributions or, in other words, the con-
tinuous state space approach, presents some extra difficulties. In this case, there is practically
no related literature. Some studies provide estimations for ergodic densities (see Johnson, 2000,
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2005). However, no studies provide, simultaneously, results on ergodic distributions yielded by
transition probability matrices and ergodic densities. In order to obtain a fully compatible view
between the transition probability matrices results and their continuous counterpart, we generated
ergodic densities considering the information in the (discretized) ergodic distributions (1× 20).
Specifically, we generated normal distributions for each of the twenty states over which prob-
ability is spread out, with a number of observations proportional to each state’s share of ergodic
probability. This generates a pseudo-histogram in which we do not have bars, but normal dis-
tributions. Then we proceed in exactly the same way as when smoothing both initial and final
distributions, i.e., by considering kernel methods to smooth the observations in each of these
twenty states.
This algorithm yields ergodic densities which are fully consistent with the ergodic distribu-
tions computed from transition probability matrices. This continuous state approach turns out
to naturally complement the view provided by discrete ergodic distributions, which tend to sum-
marize too much information in too few states. Although the information provided by ergodic
densities is essentially the same, it is far easier to analyze.
4. Data and sample
Data were drawn from the CHELEM database4 and correspond to 59 countries that together account
for 96.7% of world output and 86.5% of international trade. The variables selected to measure
flows between countries are volume of exports.5 The analysis is restricted to trade on goods only,
as it was not possible to split data on service exports between the different exporting countries.
We perform our computations for the 1967–2004 period, for which we had complete informa-
tion for the 59 countries selected. This period corresponds to what some authors have coined as
the second wave of globalization (see O’Rourke and Williamson, 1999, 2002; Maddison, 2001).
All computations were performed for a 20×20 grid, which enables a more detailed assessment
of how distributions evolve. However, in order to ease interpretation and understanding, results
are displayed with 20× 20 matrices converted into 5× 5 matrices, summming over each group of
four states in the 20× 20 matrix. The limits of grids vary, depending on the indicator.
4Information on the CHELEM (Comptes Harmonisés sur les Echanges et l’Economie Mondi-
ale, or Harmonised Accounts on Trade and The World Economy) database is available at URL
http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/chelem.htm.
5Some authors stress the much greater importance of imports than exports (see Rodrik, 1999). In our case, the
computations for indicators based on imports do not alter the general results, although they may differ for some
specific countries. These results are not reported due to space limitations, but are available from the authors upon
request.
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5. Results
Figures 1, 2 and 3 contain information on summary statistics for the three indicators of interest.
Figure 1 shows that the average value for DO from 1967 to 2004 increases substantially, especially
up to the first oil crisis in the seventies, and also from the early nineties onwards. By the end
of the analyzed period the degree of openness approached, on average, 25% of the maximum
attainable level, a relatively low value taking into account the fact that we have controlled for the
home country bias explained by each economy’s size. The coefficient of variation (figure 1, lower
panel), which also considers the growing average effect, shows a slight tendency to converge in
DO, with the remarkable exception of the first oil crisis.
The upper panel in figure 2 shows that the structure of trade, as measured by the degree of
connection among economies, reaches values close to 0.60, and as such, higher than their degree
of openness. We can also notice that indirect connections contribute to increasing the degree
of connection among economies; note, for instance, that a single indirect connection (γ = 0.5),
meaning that a product is traded twice, raises the degree of total connection to over 0.75 (DTC >
0.75). On the other hand, differences among countries, as measured by standard deviation and
the coefficient of variation, are lessened if compared to DO, and they are further reduced if we
consider indirect connections. However, this indicator shows no tendency to convergence among
countries over time.
Finally, descriptive statistics regarding the level of international economic integration, as
measured by the degree of integration (DI) are shown in figure 3. The DI index merges the effects
of both DO and DTC, showing a steadily increasing path for the analyzed period, over which
its value increased by more than 50%. Economic integration has reached levels over 40% higher
than what could be attainable in a perfectly economic integrated world with no trade barriers
and transaction costs; should we consider indirect connections, the percentage would approach
50%. This growing tendency contributes to reducing convergence among countries regarding DI,
i.e., although the average tendency is of increasing degrees of integration, disparities are declining
when measured by standard deviation, yet they increase slightly when measured by the coefficient
of variation.
Building on the analysis of these two moments in the distributions (mean and standard devia-
tion), we employed the techniques described in Section 3 to explore more thoroughly the dynamics
for the three indices, and also forecasted their evolution. Thus, we can disclose not only the er-
godic distributions (i.e., distributions corresponding to the steady state) towards which the world
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economy will head under current trends, but also how long it will take to reach this steady state.
The discrete Markov chain methods introduced in Section 3 provide a more thorough view
on dynamics, by focusing on how different parts of the distribution evolve over time. Results on
transition probability matrices are shown in tables 1 through 5. Each one contains information
on both unweighted and weighted transitions (GDP-weighted and population-weighted), which
are presented in three vertically-arrayed panels. In addition, information is displayed sequentially
for all indices considered, i.e., degree of openness (table 1), degree of total connection (tables 2
and 3, for γ = 1 and γ = 0.5, respectively), and degree of integration (tables 4 and 5, for γ = 1
and γ = 0.5, respectively).
Each panel offers information which goes beyond that contained in the transitions of every
5× 5 matrix. The first row in each panel provides information on the upper limits of each class.
Therefore, table 1.a would suggest that the 20% of country-year pairs with the lowest degrees
of openness have DO < 0.089, i.e., they export less than 9% of their GDP (corrected for home
bias). On the other hand, the 20% of country-year pairs with the highest degrees of openness
export more than 31.1% of their home bias-corrected GDP (DO > 0.311). The left column of
each 5× 5 matrix contains the percentage of observations that started the period in a particular
class. Therefore, in table 1.a, 21% of observations started the period with DO < 0.089, and
then remained in, or transited out to other (upper) states; whereas, on the opposite side, 18%
of observations started with DO > 0.311 and remained in, or transited out to other (lower)
states. The upper-left cell of the matrix in table 1.a indicates that 73% remained in the lower
class of DO whereas the remaining 20% transited to state 2 (containing observations with DO
between 0.089 and 0.151, or 8.9% and 15.1%), 4% to state 3, 2% to state 4 and 1% to state 5.
On the other hand, the lower-right cell suggests that only 9% of observations transited to state 4,
whereas 89% of observations remained in the highest-degree of openness class. Interpretations are
analogous for every cell in the matrix. The elements on the main diagonal provide information on
persistence or mobility—if probability approaches 1 or 0, respectively. As we can see, transitions
to upper states overshadow those to lower states. For instance, entry a22 in the matrix reveals
that 57% of observations in state 2 (DO < 0.151) remained in that state of openness, 11% of
observations transited to state 1, yet a bigger share transited out to upper states (25% to state
3 and 6% to state 4, respectively). This would suggest that once countries reach the highest
openness categories, they tend to remain there, suggesting that openness is almost an absorbing
state. This result would be consistent with a simple model in which countries seek policies which
enhance their long-run openness (Kremer et al., 2001).
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Apart from the intra-distribution mobility information contained in the transition matrix,
each table also contains information on the shape of the distribution, along with its hypothetical
stationary distribution. For the DO (unweighted) case (table 1.a), the three lower rows (right
below the 5× 5 matrix) contain data on the initial, final, and ergodic distributions, respectively.
The initial distribution indicates that by 1967 most countries (37%) had degrees of openness
below 0.089; a deeper scrutiny reveals that the overwhelming majority of countries had degrees of
openness below 0.151 (68%). However, the shape of the final distribution offers quite a different
aspect, with probability mass concentrating overwhelmingly in the upper state—i.e., state five,
with DO > 0.311 contains 49% of the probability mass. This information complements what
summary statistics (mean and standard deviation) revealed, adding more precision, as we gain
insights on how the entire distribution has evolved over the sample period.
However, this information is of discrete nature, i.e., the view we have on the distributions is
reported in five states. In order to circumvent this disadvantage, figure 4 presents the continuous
counterpart to the initial distribution, final distribution and ergodic distributions in table 1. It
corroborates that dynamics are more complex than what summary statistics revealed, since by
2004 the density clearly shifts to higher levels of the DO index, and the aspect of the distribution
reveals some intricacies: although state five contains almost half the probability mass, its con-
tiguous state (state 4) contains only 12% of probability, whereas the middle state goes up again
(22%). This finding would indicate that, as suggested, dynamics are involved, and in the most
recent years most countries are becoming much more open, whereas a non-negligible group lags
behind.
The ergodic distribution (shown in the last row of each table) offers a more radical view
since, according to the discrete information, probability mass concentrates increasingly in the
upper states, with state five containing the largest share of probability mass (72%), i.e., in the
stationary state 72% of world economies will have degrees of openness of over 0.311. Therefore,
under current trends, the distribution of probability mass will reverse, since by 1967 almost 70%
collapsed at lower states, whereas the steady state suggests a similar amount of probability will
concentrate in an upper state only (state 5).
The lower panels in table 1 contain information on weighted transitions. Table 1.b is the
GDP-weighted counterpart to table 1.a; therefore, it does not show transitions of countries but
transitions of shares of world GDP. Accordingly, the first column in the table contains information
on the share of world GDP starting in a particular state. For instance, 40% of world GDP
pertained to countries that at some point in time had DO < 0.089 and five years later either
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remained or transited out to states of higher openness. On the other hand, those countries
starting in the state of highest openness (which then either remained or transited out to other
states) have only 5% of world GDP.6
In this GDP-weighted case, in which for the sake of comparison the limits of the states are
the same as for the unweighted case, entries off the main diagonal are lower, indicating higher
persistence—entries on the main diagonal average to 0.76, compared to 0.67 for the unweighted
case. This result is corroborated through table 6, which provides results on mobility indices
showing that, indeed, mobility is stronger in the unweighted case. Differences are even more
marked when comparing the distributions in the last rows of the table. For instance, the initial
distribution shows that 37% of countries in state 1 (less openness) had 71% of world GDP; if we
extend the selection to state 2, the share of world GDP goes up to 85%. In other words, by 1967
the richest countries were quite closed to trade, and only 15% (12%, 2% and 1% in states 3, 4 and
5, respectively) exported more than 15.1% of their GDP. However, by 2004, the probability is, if
not totally reversed, quite different, since even though a large share of world GDP is allocated in
relatively closed countries (31% and 16% of probability mass are in states 1 and 2, respectively),
a remarkable 27% of probability (world GDP) corresponds to state 5. Again, multi-modality is
observed by 2004, both in this table and in figure 4.b, since states 2 and 4 are those with lower
amounts of probability mass.
Akin to the unweighted case, the ergodic distribution provides a smoother view in which bi-
modality has faded away almost entirely, less corrupted by possible outliers or tendencies which
might have accelerated only recently, i.e., if the dynamics of the sample years continue. The
change in the situation predicted by the ergodic distribution is impressive: almost 81% of world
GDP would correspond to the more open countries (with a level of openness similar to Germany
in 2004), whereas only 1% (states 1 and 2) would correspond to the more closed ones. The density
function corroborates this finding entirely (figure 4.b), as probability mass concentrates primarily
above 0.311, which corresponds exactly to state 5.
Table 1.c is the population-weighted counterpart to table 1.a. In this case, the first column
indicates the population corresponding to the countries initially in each of the five states, which
then transit out to other states. Similarly to the GDP-weighted case, the largest number of people
(56%) inhabits the countries with the lower degree of openness, which after five years transit out to
other states. This matrix shows higher mobility, as entries on the main diagonal average to 0.65,
6Although we refer to “world GDP”, we are considering the GDP corresponding to the 59 countries in our
sample which, in any case, account for the largest share of world GDP.
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even lower than in the unweighted case. However, more distinctive features of the population-
weighted dynamics are revealed by the last three rows in table 1.c. The initial distribution shows
the probability mass almost entirely skewed to the left, since 94% of the world population lives
in countries with the lowest degree of openness (states 1 and 2). As of 2004, the scenario is
quite different, since by then the population tends to live in the most open countries, although
to a more limited extent—state 5 comprises “only” 44% of the world population, compared to
78% in state 1 by 1967. Should these 38-year tendencies continue, the stationary distribution
would suggest the population will live predominantly mostly in more open countries—i.e., 92%
of probability lies in states 4 and 5.
Results corresponding to degree of total connection (DTC) are displayed in table 2 and
table 3, for γ = 1 and γ = 0.5, respectively. Interpretations are analogous to those for DO.
However, since we considered the same criterion for setting the limits between states, these are
different, due to the marked discrepancies between the values for DO and DTC—-regardless of
the γ considered, i.e., whereas DO values are closer to zero, values for DTC are closer to unity,
especially for lower values of γ. Accordingly, the first column of the first panel in each table,
corresponding to unweighted transitions, contains a similar number of observations as in the first
column in table 1.a. Before proceeding it is worth noting the relevance of the limits between
states, which are also different for different values of γ.
In the case of γ = 1 (table 2), results do not entirely mimic those obtained for DO. In this
case, mobility is stronger when weighting by population (entries in the main diagonal average to
0.54, compared to 0.59 in the GDP-weighted case, and 0.56 in the unweighted case), for which we
find an ergodic distribution with probability collapsing at upper states (57% of the population
would inhabit countries in state 4 and state 5, see last row in table 2.c). In the GDP-weighted
case probability tends to distribute in a sort of bimodality, but these correspond to lower values
of DTC in the case of γ = 1.
All these dynamics refer to the unweighted case (table 2.a), which shows more moderate
annual transitions compared to table 1.a, as revealed by ergodic distributions showing probability
moderately concentrating at upper states (29% for both states 4 and 5, see table 2.a). However,
we should bear in mind the fact that the upper limits are higher in the case of DTC, either under
γ = 1 or γ = 0.5. Comparing both weighting schemes to the unweighted case (i.e., tables 2.b
and 2.c vs. table 2.a) provides us with some interesting findings, as both weighted cases show
probability initially skewed to the left—i.e., both rich countries and heavily populated countries
were rather closed—, whereas for 2004 it is skewed to the right yet only for the population-
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weighted case. Therefore, the structure of trade would seem to differ substantially between rich
and most-populated countries, since the latter show more balanced connections with the rest of
the world.
Results for different values of γ change, but the main tendencies hold for γ = 0.5 (see table 3).
The most interesting result is that ergodic distributions show probability collapsing more strongly
in the upper states for the unweighted case and, especially, in the population-weighted case (tables
3.a and 3.c). However, for GDP-weighted transitions bimodality disappears and probability tends
to accumulate more strongly and increasingly in the middle states (table 3.b). These findings are
corroborated through figure 5, which represents continuous counterparts (densities) to tables 2 and
3. They corroborate the discrete analysis for both γ’s considered, and for all weighting schemes.
When all weighting schemes are compared the finding that the most-populated countries exhibit
the most radical tendencies is especially remarkable, as probability mass tends to concentrate
more tightly over time and for γ = 0.5.
Finally, tables 4 and 5, and figure 6, report results on DI, for the two values of γ considered,
which merge results for DO and DTC. Again, interpretations should be made with care, since the
grids differ from those considered for DO and DTC, and also between different values of γ, which
represent a balance between the grids chosen for DO and DTC. Regardless of the γ considered,
and the weighting scheme, ergodic distributions show probability collapsing more strongly in
the upper states, after departing from initial distributions strongly skewed to the left, and final
distributions with the opposite pattern. Differences across weighting schemes are as apparent
as for DTC, suggesting that the sources of international economic integration for each country
may be different: whereas for the most populated countries they come from a more balanced
trade structure, richer countries seem to integrate when they are more open. In general, when
accounting for indirect connections (γ = 0.5), the tendency to concentrate in the upper integration
states is stressed for all economies, GDP and population. Specifically, the ergodic distribution
predicts that 80% of countries, 72% of GDP and 75% of population will correspond to integration
levels above 0.482, i.e., they will have completed half the way to maximum integration.
The continuous counterparts to tables 4 and 5 are shown in figure 6. The view they provide
for the DI, analogous to the discrete case, is quite elucidating, as probability shifts rightwards for
all instances—regardless of the γ considered and the weighting scheme. Comparing unweighted
results (figure 6.a) reveals that integration has shifted rightwards, yet probability is more spread
by 2004, indicating an increased variety, which will eventually (ergodic distribution) turn into
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bi-modality.7 Weighting by GDP yields similar results, although multi-modality is not so obvious.
However, it is in the case of weighting by population that results differ, as we depart from very low
values (probability is strongly skewed to the left), it turns clearly bi-modal by 2004 (suggesting
some very heavily populated countries are participating in the international integrating process,
while others are doing so to a lesser extent), but in the hypothetical long run bi-modality will
fade away. In addition, if we compare population-weighted results with either GDP-weighted
or unweighted results, regardless of the γ considered, international economic integration will be
stronger, suggesting that population will mostly inhabit integrated countries.
Tables 7 through 9 report results on statistical significance of differences across different
matrices, which are all significant at 1% significance level.
In order to assess whether the pace of the integration process has intensified from 1990,
as figures 1 through 3 seem to suggest, we also computed ergodic distributions resulting from
transitions between 1990 and 2004, for all cases considered. Results are displayed in table 10
where, in order to ease direct comparison, results for 1967–2004 are also displayed. In the case
of DO, the pace speeds up, as probability mass concentrates more strongly in state 5 for the
1990–2004 distributions. Results for DTC are more difficult to interpret, suggesting that the
balanced connections may have diminished over the last few years. Merging results for both DO
and DTC, it seems that the evolution in the making of the DI is dominated by DO, as ergodic
distributions for theDI index corresponding to the last sub-period tend to concentrate probability
overwhelmingly in state 5. All differences between ergodic distributions are significant, as shown
by the p-values in the last column of the table.
Finally, we also assessed how long it may take to get close to the steady state, as implied by the
structures of the transition probability matrices. As suggested in Section 3.3, a useful criterion of
speed of convergence to the ergodic distribution is the asymptotic half-life of convergence, H−L,
whose results are displayed in table 11 and indicate how many periods (1 period=5 years, since
we compute five-year transitions) are necessary for the distance between the current (2004) and
the ergodic distribution to decrease by half.
According to table 11, in the case of unweighted DIγ=1 it would take 5.646×5 ≈ 28.230 years
to reduce the distance between the ergodic and current (2004) distribution by half, whereas for
γ = 0.5 it would take slightly longer (30.200 years). Results are different for the two weighting
schemes. For the GDP-weighted case, the pace slows down, as it would take 8.682 × 5 ≈ 43.410
7Bandwidth selection is critical for this finding, and it could be argued that the bi-modality found is simply a
result of under-smoothing. However, the result was robust for several smoothing parameters.
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years to reduce the same distance by half, while for population-weighted transitions the path
accelerates (3.827 × 5 ≈ 19.135). Results are not entirely coincidental if we consider only the
1990–2004 period, according to which speeds of convergence are more alike for the three weighting
schemes, especially under γ = 0.5, suggesting that the source of integration among the most-
populated countries, namely, the degree of connection, has decreased over the recent years.
6. Conclusions
According to many opinions, globalization is advancing and, should the underlying trends of
recent decades continue, the world economy may be expected to achieve high levels of IEI in
the near future. The analysis carried out in this study corroborates this perception, based on
instruments that enable careful interpretation of the nature of the process and their driving
factors, contributing also to measuring their speed and, above all, to characterizing how economies
have evolved in terms of degree of openness, degree of connection, and degree of integration.
The point of departure for the research was the axiomatic definition of a Standard of Perfect
International Integration (see Arribas et al., 2007), the arrival point for a world economy in which
all countries would trade with no frictions, costs or any other type of impediment. Building on
the measurement of the evolution from 1967 to 2004, we analyze the dynamics of the integration
process with a set of techniques extensively used by the empirical literature on growth, in order
to project those tendencies which have existed over the past decades onto the future and to assess
the perspectives for IEI.
Results can be summarized following several lines:
1. The openness of economies doubled (on average) from 1967 to 2004, and the distribution
dynamics for the degree of openness shows that, by 2004, almost twice the number of
countries and population in our sample are situated in economies whose degrees of openness
are larger than 30%. If this tendency were to continue, more than two thirds of countries,
GDP and world population would be facing much more open scenarios. If we weight, either
for economic size (GDP) or demography (population), the process is more intense, and the
tendency for the degree of openness to increase is stronger.
2. The degree of connection measures how encompassing and balanced (according to their
size) trade relations among economies are, and by the beginning of the 21st century it had
reached a remarkably high level. The degree of connection is higher than 60% if we consider
only direct connections, and it reaches 75% if we allow for indirect trade connections among
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countries. Distribution dynamics are strongly influenced by this fact, since most economies
are already closely connected with the rest. Related to this, the biggest advances can be
expected from an intensification of indirect connections, for which statistical information
is not available, although one may reasonably conclude they are increasing (i.e., the γ
parameter is decreasing). As a consequence, one may expect that for most economies the
degree of connection will approach its highest level.
3. Both factors referred to above, i.e., degree of openness and degree of connection (trade
structure) contribute to economic integration in different ways. The advance in the degree
of international integration between 1967 and 2004 was substantial, and the degree of inte-
gration index is close to 50%. Should this tendency hold, the number of countries with high
levels of IEI will become much higher, as well as the percentage of world population that
inhabits these countries. The ergodic distribution corresponding to the degree of integration
(DI) illustrates this finding, since probability mass concentrates more strongly over time in
those states corresponding to the highest values of DI. Within fifty years, more than 70%
of countries, world population and GDP will be half way to the steady state distribution,
representing high degrees of integration, although prospects are not as rosy if we assume
less indirect connections.
4. The weighted results regarding countries’ GDP show that a progressive increase in the
weight of economies with high degrees of integration will occur. Some economic areas
with average, or low, levels of integration are still important for the world economy, yet
with a decreasing weight. But the pace of advance toward world economic integration will
accelerate in most countries—especially in the most populated but also in others with high
weight in terms of GDP.
5. In the framework of these general trends, the analysis of the distribution dynamics under-
taken shows that differences have existed and will not completely vanish in the near future,
as shown both by the values of the transition probability matrices, which do not abandon
the main diagonal easily, and the ergodic distributions. The ergodic densities (the con-
tinuous counterpart to the discrete ergodic distributions) corroborate these findings and,
simultaneously, provide further details to the analysis.
In sum, the speed at which IEI is advancing is noteworthy, and the ergodic distribution may
quickly be approached, although there is a remarkable heterogeneity among countries in this
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respect. Most economies are achieving degrees of trade openness and trade structure (degree of
connection) which lead to high economic integration levels. However, in many cases this result
is still far from the Standard of Perfect Economic Integration as defined. This finding coincides
with some of the ideas disseminated by Rodrik (2000), who considered that we are still a long
way from a world in which markets for goods, services, and factors of production are perfectly
integrated, “contrary to conventional wisdom and much punditry”, or with Frankel (2000), who
points out that globalization of trade and finance is “less impressive than most non-economists
think”. The question still remaining relates to which factors and barriers (geographic, political,
historical, cultural, or economic) explain, for each different case, the difficulties in obtaining a
higher level of integration without costs and without frictions, or oppose it altogether. The results
obtained and methods used in our study may provide a base on which to deal with this question.
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Table 1: Transition probability matrix and ergodic distribution, degree of openness (DO), 1967
to 2004, 5-year transitions, limits all years
Upper limit, all years:
(Share of observations) 0.089 0.151 0.210 0.311 1.129
(0.21) 0.73 0.20 0.04 0.02 0.01
(0.21) 0.11 0.57 0.25 0.06 0.01
(0.20) 0.01 0.11 0.56 0.30 0.02
(0.20) 0.00 0.02 0.12 0.62 0.24
(0.18) 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.09 0.89
Initial distribution 0.37 0.31 0.19 0.05 0.08
Final distribution 0.08 0.09 0.22 0.12 0.49
Ergodic distribution 0.01 0.05 0.07 0.15 0.72
a) Unweighted
Upper limit, all years:
(Share of world GDP) 0.089 0.151 0.210 0.311 1.129
(0.40) 0.83 0.16 0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.27) 0.10 0.64 0.23 0.03 0.00
(0.16) 0.00 0.06 0.64 0.29 0.01
(0.12) 0.00 0.01 0.11 0.72 0.16
(0.05) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.95
Initial distribution 0.71 0.14 0.12 0.02 0.01
Final distribution 0.31 0.16 0.22 0.04 0.27
Ergodic distribution 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.14 0.81
b) GDP-weighted
Upper limit, all years:
(Share of world
population)
0.089 0.151 0.210 0.311 1.129
(0.56) 0.75 0.17 0.07 0.01 0.00
(0.16) 0.11 0.55 0.23 0.11 0.00
(0.14) 0.00 0.08 0.49 0.40 0.03
(0.10) 0.00 0.01 0.12 0.60 0.27
(0.04) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.85
Initial distribution 0.78 0.16 0.05 0.01 0.00
Final distribution 0.08 0.27 0.13 0.08 0.44
Ergodic distribution 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.31 0.61
c) Population-weighted
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Table 2: Transition probability matrix and ergodic distribution, degree of total connection
(DTCγ=1), with limits corresponding to DTCγ=0.5, 1967 to 2004, 5-year transitions,
limits all years
Upper limit, all years:
(Share of observations) 0.617 0.713 0.837 0.918 0.984
(0.51) 0.76 0.17 0.06 0.01 0.00
(0.10) 0.24 0.47 0.24 0.05 0.00
(0.12) 0.06 0.20 0.43 0.27 0.04
(0.15) 0.03 0.03 0.17 0.55 0.22
(0.12) 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.34 0.58
Initial distribution 0.61 0.12 0.08 0.07 0.12
Final distribution 0.46 0.14 0.19 0.19 0.03
Ergodic distribution 0.45 0.12 0.14 0.18 0.11
a) Unweighted
Upper limit, all years:
(Share of world GDP) 0.617 0.713 0.837 0.918 0.984
(0.46) 0.74 0.25 0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.23) 0.25 0.62 0.11 0.01 0.00
(0.08) 0.08 0.18 0.50 0.19 0.04
(0.08) 0.00 0.02 0.18 0.44 0.36
(0.15) 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.32 0.64
Initial distribution 0.76 0.04 0.07 0.02 0.11
Final distribution 0.49 0.16 0.26 0.09 0.00
Ergodic distribution 0.34 0.28 0.12 0.13 0.13
b) GDP-weighted
Upper limit, all years:
(Share of world
population)
0.617 0.713 0.837 0.918 0.984
(0.36) 0.70 0.21 0.09 0.00 0.00
(0.13) 0.14 0.34 0.33 0.18 0.01
(0.19) 0.02 0.12 0.55 0.22 0.09
(0.18) 0.00 0.07 0.15 0.53 0.25
(0.14) 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.32 0.58
Initial distribution 0.62 0.21 0.05 0.05 0.07
Final distribution 0.21 0.04 0.39 0.32 0.04
Ergodic distribution 0.07 0.10 0.26 0.31 0.26
c) Population-weighted
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Table 3: Transition probability matrix and ergodic distribution, degree of total connection
(DTCγ=0.5), 1967 to 2004, 5-year transitions, limits all years
Upper limit, all years:
(Share of observations) 0.617 0.713 0.837 0.918 0.984
(0.20) 0.76 0.21 0.02 0.00 0.01
(0.21) 0.17 0.63 0.19 0.01 0.00
(0.19) 0.01 0.11 0.65 0.21 0.02
(0.20) 0.00 0.01 0.12 0.64 0.23
(0.20) 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.22 0.76
Initial distribution 0.32 0.20 0.25 0.09 0.14
Final distribution 0.15 0.17 0.22 0.31 0.15
Ergodic distribution 0.05 0.08 0.17 0.33 0.37
a) Unweighted
Upper limit, all years:
(Share of world GDP) 0.617 0.713 0.837 0.918 0.984
(0.10) 0.74 0.25 0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.30) 0.12 0.69 0.19 0.00 0.00
(0.21) 0.01 0.20 0.76 0.03 0.00
(0.20) 0.00 0.12 0.84 0.04 0.00
(0.19) 0.00 0.12 0.84 0.04 0.00
Initial distribution 0.14 0.21 0.50 0.04 0.11
Final distribution 0.04 0.08 0.51 0.34 0.03
Ergodic distribution 0.12 0.40 0.46 0.02 0.00
b) GDP-weighted
Upper limit, all years:
(Share of world
population)
0.617 0.713 0.837 0.918 0.984
(0.07) 0.67 0.31 0.01 0.00 0.01
(0.14) 0.20 0.48 0.31 0.01 0.00
(0.21) 0.01 0.07 0.60 0.31 0.01
(0.30) 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.57 0.35
(0.28) 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.27 0.71
Initial distribution 0.33 0.19 0.17 0.23 0.08
Final distribution 0.09 0.02 0.14 0.63 0.12
Ergodic distribution 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.41 0.51
c) Population-weighted
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Table 4: Transition probability matrix and ergodic distribution, degree of integration (DIγ=1),
with limits corresponding to DIγ=0.5, 1967 to 2004, 5-year transitions, limits all years
Upper limit, all years:
(Share of observations) 0.258 0.334 0.398 0.482 0.989
(0.32) 0.74 0.23 0.02 0.00 0.01
(0.24) 0.09 0.61 0.23 0.07 0.00
(0.17) 0.00 0.10 0.59 0.26 0.05
(0.14) 0.00 0.03 0.12 0.60 0.25
(0.13) 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.13 0.85
Initial distribution 0.58 0.27 0.10 0.03 0.02
Final distribution 0.10 0.20 0.24 0.15 0.31
Ergodic distribution 0.01 0.05 0.10 0.21 0.63
a) Unweighted
Upper limit, all years:
(Share of world GDP) 0.258 0.334 0.398 0.482 0.989
(0.49) 0.92 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.26) 0.04 0.75 0.19 0.02 0.00
(0.15) 0.00 0.11 0.64 0.24 0.01
(0.07) 0.00 0.02 0.16 0.61 0.21
(0.03) 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.13 0.86
Initial distribution 0.73 0.22 0.05 0.00 0.00
Final distribution 0.31 0.23 0.20 0.11 0.15
Ergodic distribution 0.01 0.07 0.12 0.23 0.57
b) GDP-weighted
Upper limit, all years:
(Share of world
population)
0.258 0.334 0.398 0.482 0.989
(0.59) 0.77 0.21 0.02 0.00 0.00
(0.17) 0.09 0.56 0.21 0.14 0.00
(0.13) 0.00 0.08 0.60 0.25 0.07
(0.07) 0.00 0.02 0.17 0.42 0.39
(0.04) 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.18 0.81
Initial distribution 0.86 0.11 0.02 0.01 0.00
Final distribution 0.08 0.34 0.13 0.08 0.37
Ergodic distribution 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.24 0.67
c) Population-weighted
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Table 5: Transition probability matrix and ergodic distribution, degree of integration (DIγ=0.5),
1967 to 2004, 5-year transitions, limits all years
Upper limit, all years:
(Share of observations) 0.258 0.334 0.398 0.482 0.989
(0.21) 0.70 0.23 0.04 0.02 0.01
(0.21) 0.11 0.52 0.30 0.06 0.01
(0.20) 0.02 0.13 0.52 0.30 0.03
(0.20) 0.00 0.01 0.14 0.57 0.28
(0.18) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.86
Initial distribution 0.39 0.36 0.17 0.05 0.03
Final distribution 0.09 0.05 0.20 0.22 0.44
Ergodic distribution 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.14 0.80
a) Unweighted
Upper limit, all years:
(Share of world GDP) 0.258 0.334 0.398 0.482 0.989
(0.30) 0.63 0.36 0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.37) 0.15 0.60 0.23 0.02 0.00
(0.17) 0.00 0.17 0.56 0.26 0.01
(0.12) 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.55 0.25
(0.04) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.89
Initial distribution 0.65 0.22 0.12 0.01 0.00
Final distribution 0.31 0.02 0.34 0.06 0.27
Ergodic distribution 0.00 0.02 0.08 0.18 0.72
b) GDP-weighted
Upper limit, all years:
(Share of world
population)
0.258 0.334 0.398 0.482 0.989
(0.50) 0.70 0.28 0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.21) 0.11 0.45 0.29 0.14 0.01
(0.10) 0.01 0.14 0.41 0.42 0.02
(0.14) 0.00 0.01 0.11 0.57 0.31
(0.05) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.86
Initial distribution 0.75 0.20 0.04 0.01 0.00
Final distribution 0.08 0.21 0.17 0.10 0.44
Ergodic distribution 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.21 0.75
c) Population-weighted
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Table 6: Mobility indicesa
Variable Transition matrix µ1
Unweighted 0.756
DO GDP-weighted 0.723
Population-weighted 0.788
Unweighted 0.834
DTCγ=1 GDP-weighted 0.840
Population-weighted 0.848
Unweighted 0.790
DTCγ=0.5 GDP-weighted 0.896
Population-weighted 0.823
Unweighted 0.784
DIγ=1 GDP-weighted 0.763
Population-weighted 0.811
Unweighted 0.773
DIγ=0.5 GDP-weighted 0.762
Population-weighted 0.789
a See main text for definition of µ1.
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Table 7: Statistical significance (χ2) of matrices equality, degree of openness (DO)a
M
DO
unweighted M
DO
GDP-weighted M
DO
POP-weighted
M
DO
unweighted — 0.169 0.251
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000)
M
DO
GDP-weighted — 0.252
(p-value) (0.000)
a Notes: null hypothesis is that the pair of matrices corresponding
to each cell are the same. We test whether differences are sta-
tistically significant. Test statistic is distributed χ2(K(K − 1)).
Table 8: Statistical significance (χ2) of matrices equality, degree of total connection (DTC)a
M
DTCγ=1
unweighted M
DTCγ=1
GDP-weighted M
DTCγ=1
POP-weighted M
DTCγ=0.5
unweighted M
DTCγ=0.5
GDP-weighted M
DTCγ=0.5
POP-weighted
M
DTCγ=1
unweighted — 0.336 0.387 0.248 1.261 0.572
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
M
DTCγ=1
GDP-weighted — 0.544 0.641 1.728 1.113
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
M
DTCγ=1
POP-weighted — 0.397 1.946 0.658
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
M
DTCγ=0.5
unweighted — 1.996 0.312
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000)
M
DTCγ=0.5
GDP-weighted — 0.571
(p-value) (0.000)
M
DTCγ=0.5
POP-weighted —
(p-value)
a Notes: null hypothesis is that the pair of matrices corresponding to each cell are the same. We test whether
differences are statistically significant. Test statistic is distributed χ2(K(K − 1)).
Table 9: Statistical significance (χ2) of matrices equality, degree of integration (DI)a
M
DIγ=1
unweighted M
DIγ=1
GDP-weighted M
DIγ=1
POP-weighted M
DIγ=0.5
unweighted M
DIγ=0.5
GDP-weighted M
DIγ=0.5
POP-weighted
M
DIγ=1
unweighted — 0.137 0.222 0.059 0.179 0.199
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
M
DIγ=1
GDP-weighted — 0.258 0.207 0.249 0.333
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
M
DIγ=1
POP-weighted — 0.253 0.334 0.262
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
M
DIγ=0.5
unweighted — 0.082 0.190
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000)
M
DIγ=0.5
GDP-weighted — 0.157
(p-value) (0.000)
M
DIγ=0.5
POP-weighted —
(p-value)
a Notes: null hypothesis is that the pair of matrices corresponding to each cell are the same. We test whether
differences are statistically significant. Test statistic is distributed χ2(K(K − 1)).
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Table 10: Ergodic distributions, all data vs. 1990–2004 data
Ergodic distributions
χ2(p-value)
1967–2004 1990–2004
DO
Upper limits: 0.089 0.151 0.210 0.311 1.129 0.089 0.151 0.210 0.311 1.129
Unweighted 0.02 0.05 0.07 0.15 0.72 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.93 −0.086(0.000)
GDP-weighted 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.14 0.81 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.96 −0.020(0.000)
Population-weighted 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.31 0.61 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.30 0.67 −0.010(0.000)
DTCγ=1
Upper limits: 0.617 0.713 0.837 0.918 0.984 0.617 0.713 0.837 0.918 0.984
Unweighted 0.45 0.12 0.14 0.18 0.11 0.51 0.19 0.13 0.13 0.04 −0.013(0.000)
GDP-weighted 0.34 0.28 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.70 0.13 0.05 0.08 0.04 0.036(0.000)
Population-weighted 0.07 0.10 0.26 0.31 0.26 0.21 0.06 0.30 0.26 0.17 0.283(0.000)
DTCγ=0.5
Upper limits: 0.617 0.713 0.837 0.918 0.984 0.617 0.713 0.837 0.918 0.984
Unweighted 0.05 0.08 0.17 0.33 0.37 0.12 0.04 0.25 0.35 0.25 0.032(0.000)
GDP-weighted 0.12 0.40 0.46 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.86 0.08 0.06 0.690(0.000)
Population-weighted 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.41 0.51 0.13 0.01 0.13 0.41 0.32 0.098(0.000)
DIγ=1
Upper limits: 0.258 0.334 0.398 0.482 0.989 0.258 0.334 0.398 0.482 0.989
Unweighted 0.01 0.05 0.10 0.21 0.63 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.09 0.87 −0.041(0.000)
GDP-weighted 0.01 0.07 0.12 0.23 0.57 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.08 0.90 −0.014(0.000)
Population-weighted 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.24 0.66 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.26 0.72 −0.005(0.000)
DIγ=0.5
Upper limits: 0.258 0.334 0.398 0.482 0.989 0.258 0.334 0.398 0.482 0.989
Unweighted 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.14 0.80 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.93 −0.070(0.000)
GDP-weighted 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.18 0.72 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.95 −0.015(0.000)
Population-weighted 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.21 0.75 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.14 0.84 −0.002(0.000)
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Table 11: Transition path analysis (asymptotic half life of convergence)a
Variable Transition matrix H − L, 1967–2004 H − L, 1990–2004
Unweighted 5.646 5.860
DIγ=1 (limits γ = 0.5) GDP-weighted 8.682 7.872
Population-weighted 3.827 3.701
Unweighted 6.040 4.991
DIγ=0.5 GDP-weighted 8.235 4.400
Population-weighted 3.621 4.053
a See main text for definition of H − L.
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Figure 1: Descriptive statistics for DO, 1967–2004
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Figure 2: Descriptive statistics, DTC 1967–2004
1970 1980 1990 2000
0
.
5
5
0
.
6
0
0
.
6
5
0
.
7
0
0
.
7
5
0
.
8
0
Year
M
e
a
n
γ = 1 —— γ = 0.5 ------
1970 1980 1990 2000
0
.
0
0
.
1
0
.
2
0
.
3
0
.
4
0
.
5
Year
S
t
d
.
d
e
v
.
,
c
o
e
f
.
v
a
r
.
γ = 1, std.dev. —— γ = 0.5, std.dev. ------ γ = 1, coef.var. ······· γ = 0.5, coef.var. -·-·-·-
38
Figure 3: Descriptive statistics, DI 1967–2004
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Figure 4: Degree of openness (DO), densities, 1967 vs. 2004 vs. ergodic
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Figure 5: Degree of total connection (DTC), densities, 1967 vs. 2004 vs. ergodic
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Figure 6: Degree of integration (DI), densities, 1967 vs. 2004 vs. ergodic
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